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reasons-responsive mechanism that an agent needs in order to be respon-
sible. Chapter 12 addresses a challenge from Manuel Vargas concerning 
the plausibility of employing tracing in a theory of moral responsibility—
“tracing” being the idea that an agent will often be responsible for some-
thing at a time in virtue of having had control at an earlier time. Fischer’s 
responses here are clear and persuasive, although as he himself recognises, 
there are some substantial issues to do with how one should individuate 
reasons-responsive mechanisms which are left unresolved. Nevertheless, 
there is no doubt that Fischer’s account of moral responsibility is one of 
the most sophisticated ever developed and as such demands attention 
from all who write on such issues. All in all, this is a strong collection of 
essays that deserves serious study.
Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, ed. David Palmer. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014. 248 pages. $90 (hardback).
ALLISON KRILE THORNTON, Baylor University/University of Notre 
Dame
Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates is a collection of ten new essays 
on libertarianism about free will, specifically as it has been defended by 
Robert Kane, a prominent contemporary defender of the view. In addi-
tion to the essays, the collection includes a substantive introduction by the 
editor, David Palmer, and a clear and compelling final chapter in which 
Kane replies to his critics. Kane’s contribution to the volume is especially 
valuable. He both illuminates his critics’ arguments and uses the occasion 
to clarify, defend, and develop his view in important ways. Throughout, 
Kane models productive philosophical exchange. In what follows, I dis-
cuss a central thesis from each chapter and highlight Kane’s response to it.
In Part I, “Libertarian Theories of Free Will,” Carl Ginet and Timothy 
O’Connor discuss versions of libertarianism that differ according to what 
(if anything) causes free and responsible actions. According to Kane, events 
are the causes (though in his reply to O’Connor’s chapter 3 of this volume, 
he makes an important addendum). In chapters 2 and 3 respectively, Ginet 
and O’Connor defend alternatives: non-causalist and agent-causalist ac-
counts respectively.
In “Can an Indeterministic Cause Leave a Choice Up to the Agent?,” Ginet 
argues for the view that an agent’s free and responsible actions are not caused 
because, on his view, if such actions were caused (even indeterministically), 
they would be produced by antecedent circumstances, and if they were 
produced by antecedent circumstances, they would “[have] to be viewed as 
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‘decided’ by those antecedent conditions and not by the agent” (24). Thus 
if an action were caused, it could not be up to an agent. But if an action is 
not up to an agent, then the agent cannot freely and responsibly perform 
it. In reply, Kane denies that indeterministic causal influence of antecedent 
circumstances on an action hampers an agent’s freedom and responsibility 
in performing that action. He argues that choices can be causally influenced 
by antecedent circumstances, while also being “caused or brought about by 
the agent, in particular by the agent’s making an effort to bring it about and 
succeeding in that effort” (202).
In chapter 3, “Free Will and Metaphysics,” O’Connor argues that when 
Kane’s account is “set within a plausible general metaphysical framework, 
Kane’s theory and the agent-causal theory [with which Kane’s theory is 
intended to contrast] are much closer than has so far been recognized” 
(28). To show this, O’Connor draws out two metaphysical commitments 
of Kane’s account of free will: first, that mental states are ontologically 
irreducible; second, that causation is nonreductive. O’Connor thinks that 
the best version of a view that has these commitments is a neo-Aristotelian 
causal powers account where what has the causal powers are substances 
(or agents). His reasons are twofold. First, “it becomes natural to under-
stand causes as substances” once we “abandon these Humean deflation-
ary projects” (33)—which the second metaphysical commitment requires. 
Second, such an account avoids the problem of the disappearing agent. 
But as Kane points out in his reply to O’Connor, that all causation is sub-
stance causation does not follow from the aforementioned metaphysical 
commitments, and Kane has reasons—independent of reductivism—for 
maintaining that some causes are events. Moreover, he argues that the 
occurrence of event causation does not rule out the occurrence of agent 
causation and so does not alone create the problem of the disappearing 
agent. In fact, according to Kane, one need not choose between the two 
sorts of causation and might even be “tempted to say that my view is not 
merely EC (event causal) but [AC] agent-causal and event causal or AC/EC 
(if that didn’t sound too much like a rock group)” (206, emphasis added).
Part II, “The Luck Objection,” addresses the luck objection to libertarian-
ism. By way of background, the objection is that if (as libertarianism re-
quires) our actions are not determined, then what actions we perform is a 
matter of luck in a way that undermines our freedom and responsibility. 
Kane admits that what actions we perform is a matter of luck on libertarian-
ism, but he denies that such luck undermines our freedom and responsibil-
ity. In response to the luck objection, Kane argues that an agent can be free 
and responsible for deciding to A as long as she was trying to decide to A, 
“endorse[s] the outcome as something she was trying and wanting to do 
all along” (37), and decides to A in the face of some indeterminacy about 
deciding to A. These three conditions are met in some cases of dual efforts, 
which are cases where an agent simultaneously tries to make each of two 
competing choices or decisions and succeeds in making one of them. In 
such cases, Kane argues, no matter which of the competing decisions the 
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agent ends up making, she will have been free in so deciding even though 
whichever decision she makes is a matter of luck.
In chapter 4, “Kane, Luck, and Control: Trying to Get By without Too 
Much Effort,” Alfred Mele takes issue with this reply to the luck objec-
tion. Mele notes an additional condition that must be met in dual efforts 
cases in order for the agent to decide freely: the agent’s dual efforts must 
themselves be freely made. The agent must freely try to decide to A, for ex-
ample, or else her decision to A (if it comes to that) will not itself be freely 
made. The problem, argues Mele, is that this introduces a vicious regress. 
In order for an agent to decide freely to A, she must have freely tried to 
decide to A. And in order to freely try to decide to A, she must (per Kane’s 
answer to the luck objection) have freely tried to try to decide to A, and so 
on, ad infinitum. But whether someone can so freely try is an illegitimate 
assumption given the question under dispute. Kane’s reply is that the kind 
of control an agent is required to have over the effort to decide to A (if 
she is to be free in deciding to A) can be “a compatibilist kind of control” 
(200). This stops the regress, but, as Mele points out, it introduces another 
worry: if the freedom of trying to decide to A is compatibilist, and the 
freedom of deciding to A is incompatibilist, then somehow the freedom of 
deciding to A “outstrips” the freedom of the effort.
In addition to the worries Mele highlights in chapter 4, there are two 
residual worries for a libertarian reply to the luck objection, worries that 
John Martin Fischer addresses in chapter 5, “Toward a Solution to the 
Luck Problem.” These worries (brought to light by Peter van Inwagen and 
Alfred Mele respectively) are that under the assumption of causal inde-
terminism, first, it is not the agent who makes the crucial difference as to 
what she does, and second, we cannot give an explanation of why an agent 
chooses as she actually chooses rather than choosing otherwise. These 
worries should be troubling to a libertarian because they suggest that 
causal indeterminism rules out a responsibility-grounding relationship 
between an agent’s prior states and her choices. But Fischer defends the 
libertarian against these concerns. He develops a Frankfurt-style example 
that shows that indeterminism (and the unavailability of a contrastive ex-
planation that might come with it) is compatible with an agent having the 
sort of control required for moral responsibility. In his example, which 
he calls the “Random Machine Example,” there is a deterministic world 
in which an agent makes a choice for which she is morally responsible. 
That is, in that world, the responsibility-grounding relationship between 
the agent’s prior states and her choice obtains. In the example, there is 
another world, too, like the deterministic world up to the agent’s choice 
in all ways but one: in this other world, there is machine that makes the 
world indeterministic. The machine can be in a certain internal state, M1, 
and if it is, there are two possibilities, each with an equal chance of occur-
ring. The first possibility is that the machine goes to sleep and triggers no 
causal interaction with the world. The second is that it initiates a causal 
sequence that would preempt the agent from making the choice she made 
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in the first, deterministic world. In Fischer’s example, in the indetermin-
istic world, the random machine runs through its internal states, ends up 
in M1, and then goes to sleep, so that in both worlds, the agent chooses 
and does exactly the same thing as a result of relevantly similar processes. 
Fischer argues that even though the second world is indeterministic, the 
agent is still morally responsible, for “presumably, the mere existence and 
operation of the machine in [the indeterministic world] should not in any 
way threaten these claims about the responsibility-grounding relation-
ship” (61). Kane notes that the Random Machine Example reconciles inde-
terminism with only a semicompatibilist view of moral responsibility, and 
he argues that on his view, he can reconcile indeterminism with a stronger 
libertarian view of ultimate moral responsibility (see 195–197).
In Part III, “Incompatibilism and Omissions,” Michael McKenna (chapter 
6) and David Widerker and Ira M. Schnall (chapter 7) address two different 
arguments for incompatibilism, specifically Kane’s preferred “source” or 
“ultimacy” argument and a “direct” argument respectively. In chapter 8, 
Randolph Clarke considers whether the freedom we supposedly have in 
refraining from acting is threatened by incompatibilism or compatibilism.
Kane’s ultimacy argument for incompatibilism depends on these prem-
ises: (1) an agent acts freely only if she is the ultimate source of her act, 
and (2) if determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of her acts. On 
Kane’s understanding of ultimacy, someone is the ultimate source of her 
act only if her act has no sufficient ground, cause, or explanation for which 
the agent herself is not responsible. On this understanding of ultimacy, (2) 
is clearly true. In “Compatibilist Ultimacy: Resisting the Threat of Kane’s U 
Condition,” however, McKenna doubts that Kane’s understanding of ulti-
macy is the one we ought to have. Unlike many compatibilists, he grants 
that there is something to the idea that freely acting agents need to be the 
ultimate sources of their acts, but he argues that to the extent that that idea 
is plausible, whatever “ultimate” means is something that is compatible 
with determinism. He argues that the notion of being an ultimate source 
is context-sensitive and that in most of those contexts, something can be 
an ultimate source even if determinism is true. For example, we say that a 
certain spring in France is the ultimate source of Perrier drinking water, and 
yet we don’t think that whether we’re right about that depends on whether 
determinism is false. Similarly, McKenna argues, in the context of ordinary 
discourse, an agent can be the ultimate source of her actions even if deter-
minism is true. Kane denies that ordinary discourse is the proper context 
for evaluating whether an agent is morally responsible. According to Kane, 
in the proper context for evaluating whether an agent can in principle be 
held praiseworthy or blameworthy, “it does matter whether the agent is per-
sonally responsible . . . for becoming the sort of person she is now with the 
will she has, or whether the formation of that will is entirely traceable to 
factors the origins of which she had no role in producing” (182).
In chapter 7, “The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism,” Widerker 
and Schnall defend a version of Peter van Inwagen’s Direct Argument for 
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incompatibilism (DA) in which the key premise, the so-called “Transfer 
of Non-Responsibility Rule” (TNR), is that if one is not responsible for 
p and one is not responsible for its being the case that (p entails q), then 
one is not responsible for q. (More precisely, the principle is: p, and if p 
and no one is [now] or ever has been even partly morally responsible for 
the fact that p, and [p entails q], and no one is [now] or ever has been 
even partly morally responsible for the fact that [p entails q], then q and 
no one is [now] or ever has been even partly morally responsible for the 
fact that q.) Widerker and Schnall argue that DA is dialectically superior 
to Kane’s preferred source-based argument for incompatibilism because 
Kane’s argument, unlike DA, depends on the controversial (and straight-
forwardly incompatibilist) assumption that an agent is responsible for her 
act only if she is the ultimate source of it (that is, only if the act has no 
sufficient ground, cause, or explanation for which the agent herself is not 
responsible). But Kane denies that DA has this dialectical advantage. He 
argues that, in defense of TNR, Widerker and Schnall appeal to the same 
controversial point. Widerker and Schnall, for example, argue that TNR 
is supported by the fact that we would find it puzzling were someone to 
maintain that an agent (say, Mary) is responsible for an event (say, John’s 
death) even though Mary is responsible neither for events leading up to 
John’s death nor for the fact that those events entail John’s death. But, 
Kane argues, that we find the allegation puzzling presupposes the very as-
sumption of which DA was claimed to be independent. Thus, while Kane 
acknowledges the success of much of Widerker and Schnall’s defense of 
DA, he denies that DA has the purported dialectical advantage over his 
own source-based argument.
In chapter 8, “Freedom, Responsibility, and Omitting to Act,” Clarke 
addresses the topic of moral responsibility for omissions, developing “the 
skeleton” (121) of a view about the conditions under which an agent is 
responsible for omitting to act. On Clarke’s view, whether an agent is di-
rectly morally responsible for omitting to act on some occasion depends on 
whether she freely omits to act then, and whether she freely omits to act is 
constituted by at least some (and maybe all) of the following factors: that 
she freely decides not to do the thing in question, that her intention not to 
act plays the right kind of causal role, and that she was able to perform the 
omitted action. Clarke intends for the agent’s ability to perform the omitted 
action to be understood in such a way that his account of freely omitting 
to act is “silent on whether the requisite freedom in omitting is compatible 
with determinism” (122). Kane, however, fleshes out Clarke’s view in a 
way that renders it a strictly incompatibilist account: Kane argues that in 
order for an agent to be directly morally responsible for omitting to act, she 
needs to have plural voluntary control over the omission (i.e., she needs to 
have been able to perform the omitted act voluntarily and intentionally), 
and that kind of control is incompatible with determinism.
In Part IV, “The Significance of Free Will,” the authors take up the 
question of the significance of libertarian free will—why so many people 
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have wanted it and why anyone should. In other work, Kane’s general ap-
proach to answering the significance question is to argue that libertarian 
free will is valuable because it is required for many other things we value, 
like moral responsibility, being the suitable object of reactive attitudes, 
and genuine love and personal relationships.
Though he does not go so far as to defend libertarian free will, in “Re-
sponsibility for Emotions, Alternative Possibilities, and Reasons,” Ishti-
yaque Haji argues that for many things we value, like the attitudes of 
forgiveness and guilt, there is at least an alternative possibilities require-
ment. Such attitudes require alternative possibilities because having them 
depends on our ability to act in accordance with what Haji calls “objective 
pro tanto reasons.” (For example, forgiving someone requires having as 
a reason “being willing to cease to regard the wrong done as a reason to 
weaken or dissolve the relationship ” [138].) And in order to act in accor-
dance with such reasons, it must be possible not only for us to so act but 
also to refrain from so acting. That is, we must have alternative possibili-
ties. Thus, since some things we value like forgiveness and guilt depend 
on being able to act in accordance with reasons, many things we value 
depend on there being alternative possibilities. Kane adds two qualifica-
tions: (1) that alternative possibilities are not required for every morally 
obligated act, but only that acts by which we engage in self-formation; and 
(2) that in such acts, we have plural voluntary control over the alternatives.
In “Moral Responsibility, the Reactive Attitudes, and the Significance 
of (Libertarian) Free Will,” Dana Kay Nelkin advocates for an approach to 
the significance question that she takes to contrast with Kane’s. She sug-
gests that to answer it, we start by considering “what is at stake” in the 
debate (such as moral responsibility, reactive attitudes, and personal rela-
tionships), explore whether those things really are valuable, and then, if 
they are, establish whether they depend on libertarian free agency. While 
Kane sees this strategy as a part of his own approach and not an alterna-
tive to it (210), Nelkin’s focus on the value of what is at stake is important. 
She argues that some valuable and important kinds of personal relation-
ships, like those between friends, spouses, and parents and children, are 
defined by the reactive attitudes that people in those relationships are 
disposed to have towards one another. These reactive attitudes, Nelkin 
argues, presuppose that people have placed certain demands on one an-
other. The reactive attitudes of resentment or indignation, for instance, 
presuppose that certain demands have been held to someone but not met. 
This relates to the significance question because it seems that holding-to-
demands in turn presupposes the free agency of the target of the reac-
tive attitude. It thus seems that there are particular, important kinds of 
personal relationships that presuppose free agency. Nelkin is neutral on 
whether the agency required is libertarian free agency in particular, but 
Kane, of course, argues that it must be.
Derk Pereboom, in the “Dialectic of Selfhood and the Significance of 
Free Will,” agrees with Kane that holding each other to certain demands 
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is both essential to some important kinds of human relationships and that 
it presupposes libertarian free agency. Unlike Kane, however, he is skepti-
cal that those kinds of relationships are possible. He argues that much of 
their importance can be retained even if they are not possible via similar 
relationships that presuppose “a notion of demand that does not require 
the ability to do otherwise and a sensitivity to which does not require the 
reactive attitudes” (168). The notion he identifies is the demand of axio-
logical recommendation (e.g., “You ought to stop abusing me or it will de-
stroy our relationship”). In contrast with the demand of moral obligation, 
which Nelkin’s account of personal relationships requires, the demand of 
axiological recommendation is consistent with the agent who is the target 
of the demand not being able to do otherwise. A failure to meet this sort 
of demand does not—or should not—engender reactive attitudes. For this 
reason, the kinds of personal relationships Pereboom gives an account of 
seem less valuable and important than the ones discussed by Nelkin and 
Kane. Pereboom admits that we would lose something if he is right about 
the nature of personal relationships, but he argues that the loss is not very 
significant. A disavowal of reactive attitudes in our personal relationships 
would not preclude having personal but non-reactive attitudes, like disap-
pointment, sadness, and hurt feelings. And relationships characterized by 
susceptibility to those non-reactive attitudes are especially valuable, and, 
according to Pereboom, they are valuable enough.
While the collection is limited in scope insofar as it targets only one vari-
ety of libertarianism, the authors discuss a sufficiently wide range of topics 
and perspectives that the volume would be a valuable addition to a gradu-
ate seminar on free will. Moreover, as one of the only volumes devoted to 
libertarianism, it makes for an efficient but thorough introduction to the 
contemporary debate surrounding libertarianism.1 
1Thanks to Chris Tweedt and Brandon Warmke for comments on an earlier draft of this 
review.
Free Will in Philosophical Theology, by Kevin Timpe. New York and London: 
Bloomsbury, 2014. 177 pages. $120.00 (hardcover).
JOSEF QUITTERER, University of Innsbruck
Free will is essential for Christian faith. Without free will, there would be 
no sin, no guilt, and no moral responsibility. The Christian doctrine of sal-
vation through divine forgiveness and through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ 
would be meaningless without free will. On the other hand, the Christian 
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